Existing literature on the permanent income hypothesis finds that, for some types of predictable income innovations, consumption does not react, while for others it does. Starting from the hypothesis that households may not correctly perceive and predict the relevant income innovations ex ante, we investigate whether households do understand the nature of these innovations ex post. We argue that existing studies that focus on consumption cannot, in most cases, shed light on this question. We instead focus on labor income as the dependent variable, since such approach potentially allows identification of a substitution effect driven by an ex post misperception. We develop a simple formal model to illustrate this idea. A prediction of the model is that an unexpected increase in the previous year's tax liability pushes up the perception of the marginal tax rate (MTR) in the current year, even though the MTR is not in fact changing. This, in turn, triggers the substitution effect. We use a loss of the Child Tax Credit due to a dependent child turning 17 as a source of predictable and lump-sum net income variation, and find that it reduces the growth rate of pre-tax parental labor income in the year following the loss of the credit. This result is robust to a variety of tests. We argue that the finding supports the presence of imperfect ex post understanding of the CTC-induced net income shock. We discuss broader implications of this finding.
Introduction
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) has been a central tenet of economic models of intertemporal consumption, saving, and labor supply decisions. It predicts that as long as a household can freely borrow and lend at an exogenous interest rate, then, holding the present value of income stream constant, optimal behavior is completely decoupled from the timing of income. Put differently, optimal behavior should not be affected by predictable lump-sum changes in income.
Because of this fundamental prediction, the PIH has received considerable attention in the empirical literature. Focusing on natural experiment studies based on cross-sectional and panel data, the evidence is mixed. 1 Some studies do not find any evidence in contrary to the PIH, while others find that predictable lump-sum increases (decreases) in income tend to generate increases (decreases) in consumption. In addition, almost none of the studies from the latter group can fully account for their findings by invoking liquidity constraints.
What can account for the variety in these findings? One possibility is that the results may be, to some extent, driven by different samples and data sources used in different studies. However, Hsieh (2003) provides striking evidence to the contrary. He documents that Alaskan households do not increase their consumption when paid from the (oil revenue-based) Alaska Permanent Fund, but the very same households do increase their consumption in response to the annual federal income tax refund. This finding implies that the heterogeneity of the PIH test results is unlikely to be driven by differences in samples. Rather, Hsieh comments on his results: "This evidence suggests that households will take anticipated income changes into account in their consumption decisions when the income changes are large, regular, and easy to predict, but will not do so when they are small and irregular." He also states: "...many tax and fiscal policy measures will probably have an effect on aggregate consumption as long as people find it difficult and costly to understand precisely how their incomes are affected by these policies."
In fact, there is both anecdotal and systematic evidence about taxpayers having imperfect knowledge about the tax system with which they interact. This argument proceeds along two lines of thought. The first line stresses that the tax system, particularly the federal income tax, is complex. Such complexity makes it costly for taxpayers in terms of cognitive abilities, time, or money to learn about the details. It is therefore plausible that many taxpayers are not aware of some or most tax law provisions that currently affect them, or that will affect them in the future. Note that this argument does not rely on bounded rationality. It simply stresses the fact 1 We review the evidence in the next section.
that gathering and processing information is costly, so even fully rational economic agents may prefer to have a less than perfect knowledge of the tax schedule. They then use any information they get from the interaction with the tax system, as well as any other signals, to update their beliefs. Following Feige and Pearce (1976) and Buiter (1980) , this is referred to as economically, as opposed to technically, optimal belief formation. The second line of thought focuses on framing and salience issues. It stresses that certain framing of taxes makes them more salient to economic agents, who then become more responsive, and vice versa. This line of thought relies on either bounded rationality or mental costs of calculation.
The reasoning in Hsieh (2003) suggests that not all predictable changes in net income may in fact be predicted, or understood by taxpayers ex ante. However, it is silent about whether the source and nature of these changes is fully understood ex post. Indeed, if an imperfect ex ante understanding of the income change is driven by costs of gathering and processing information or by bounded rationality, then there is no reason to expect perfect ex post understanding either. This is because the cost of information or bounded rationality are present ex post as well.
To illustrate the idea of ex post misperception, suppose that a household receives an unexpected tax rebate check from the government or it realizes an unexpected increase in its after-tax income. With imperfect understanding of the source of the surprise, the household may interpret it in multiple ways. First, the after-tax income increase could reflect a lump-sum tax decrease or a tax cut. 2 Second, the surprise could reflect a tax decrease or a tax cut derived from an across the board decrease in the marginal tax rate (MTR). Third, it could be nothing but a timing shift in the receipt of after-tax income. 3 Now consider three real-world policies that may generate such surprises in net income: (a) the 2001 tax rebate; (b) the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which lowered marginal tax rates on earned income; and (c) the 1991-92 reduction in income tax withholding.
Ignoring Ricardian equivalence reasoning, the first interpretation would be correct for the 2001 tax rebate. 4 However, it would not be correct in case of the other two policies. Again, ignoring Ricardian equivalence reasoning, the second interpretation would be correct for the mid-1980s tax cut, but incorrect for the other two policies. The third interpretation would be correct for the 1991-92 reduction in income tax withholding, but not for the other two policies.
The particular way in which an economic agent interprets the surprise determines whether the 2 In this terminology, a "decrease" is a reduction that happens due to a change in household characteristics (such as aging of household members) within the existing tax system. A "tax cut" refers to a change in the tax system.
3 Naturally, other interpretations are possible as well. 4 The 2001 tax rebate originated from a 5 percentage point tax cut on the first $12,000 ($6,000) dollars of taxable income when filing as a married couple (single). Since such reduction in the MTR was inframarginal for a vast majority of households, the resulting tax cut was in fact lump-sum. agent's subsequent actions are affected only by the implied income effect, or also by the implied substitution effect. The latter would apply if the surprise is at least partly interpreted in the second way, i.e., as an MTR tax cut. Put differently, if the agent infers that an unexpected increase in her net income is (at least partly) driven by a lower MTR at her income level, she gets to keep more of each additional dollar of pre-tax income she earns. This may in turn boost her labor supply and labor income. 5 As long as the agent has imperfect prior information about both the level and the slope of the tax schedule, an unexpectedly high after-tax income will, in general, be partly interpreted in all three ways. Importantly, this implies that the substitution effect may be triggered even if the tax liability innovation is purely lump-sum, without any change in the effective MTR.
In Section 3, we develop a model that formalizes this intuition. This model generalizes the standard full-information rational agent model by allowing for imperfect knowledge of the income tax schedule. In the model, a household is subject to an affine income tax schedule that changes from year to year due to innovations that are predictable, but not necessarily predicted, well in advance. The household perceives these innovations with noise due to information gathering and processing costs. As a result, the household is uncertain about the exact tax schedule it faces and it will use any signal generated by interaction with the tax system to update its beliefs.
In particular, the model predicts that the beliefs about the current and future MTRs increase (decrease) with a surprisingly high (low) tax liability realized in the previous tax year.
Most of the "natural experiment" empirical literature on the PIH that we referred to earlier focuses on how a predictable income surprise affects consumption, especially consumption of services and perishable goods. A majority of these studies focus on cases where the income change implies a change in lifetime resources of the same sign. In such cases, a consumption change in the same direction is consistent with any interpretation, including the correct one, in which the income effect dominates any potential substitution effect. In addition, the consumption change can also be accounted for by liquidity constraints. As a result, these studies can speak to whether a particular predictable change in the stream of net income is understood and predicted ex ante, but not to whether it is understood ex post. The latter can only be determined in studies in which the income variation originates from a pure timing shift with a negligible effect on lifetime resources, as would be the case of the 1991-92 withholding change, for example. Observing that 5 Indeed, there is empirical evidence showing that a change in the MTR can lead to sizeable substitution effects on labor and taxable income. See, for example, Eissa (1995) or Eissa and Liebman (1996) for labor force participation of women, Looney and Singhal (2004) for the intertemporal elasticity of labor earnings, and Gruber and Saez (2002) for taxable income.
consumption changes following such timing shift and not being able to account for it by liquidity constraints is indicative of households not understanding the nature of the surprise ex post. One way or another, however, any study that focuses on consumption as the outcome variable cannot speak to whether the income surprise triggers any substitution effect on labor supply. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying how household, in particular parental labor earnings, as opposed to consumption, respond to predictable lump-sum variation in after-tax income.
It is important that the variation is lump-sum since, in case of perfect ex post understanding, there should be no reaction in labor supply and labor income, save for liquidity constraints. In contrast, in the case of a comprehensive MTR tax cut, there is a true change in marginal incentives. As a result, the presence of a substitution effect does not identify whether households understand the innovation ex post or not. We focus on labor earnings because this measure captures not only hours worked, but other types of effort (such as looking for a better job) that increase the value of one's labor input. In particular, we study household reaction to a loss in the Child Tax Credit (CTC) when an eligible dependent turns 17. We focus only on households for whom this constitutes a lump-sum change in disposable income, without any impact on effective MTR. As a result, if households in our sample have correct ex post understanding of the source and nature of the surprise, the growth rate of labor income in the following year should be either unaffected in the absence of liquidity constraints, or should increase in the case of binding liquidity constraints.
The important point is that it should not decrease. If, when analyzing the data, the labor income growth rate does not change or increases following the loss of the CTC, the substitution effect may be present, but its presence cannot be proven. A decrease in the labor income growth rate, however, provides evidence for the presence of the substitution effect, and hence imperfect ex post understanding of the surprise.
Our identification strategy is based on age-discontinuity in eligibility for the CTC together with the arguably random timing of birth around the turn of the year. That is, we identify the effect by comparing the growth rate of parental labor income of married couples whose child turns 17 before the end of a year to their counterparts whose child turns 17 early in the following year.
We implement the identification strategy using panel data from the 1996-1999 and 2000-2003 waves of the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). We find that losing an eligible dependent has a negative impact on the growth rate of parental labor income in the year following the tax year in which the credit was lost. This finding is obtained despite the fact that losing the CTC has no mechanical impact on MTR for our selected sample. We show, using a variety of robustness tests, that this finding is not driven by a direct effect of child aging or a spurious correlation between timing of birth and income growth. These robustness tests also imply that the CTC has no significant effect on the growth rate of parental labor income the year before or the year after its loss, suggesting that the effect is not driven by a strategic retiming of income realization. We interpret the baseline finding as an evidence for the presence of the substitution effect, and consequently as evidence for imperfect ex post understanding of the net income surprise. This paper offers three contributions to the literature. First, it devises a novel test of the PIH based on perfectly predictable lump-sum variation in the stream of after-tax income, with the distinction of focusing on labor earnings rather than consumption as the outcome variable.
Second, it develops and tests a formal model of the ex post surprise interpretation based on the updating of beliefs and contributes to the understanding of the heterogeneity of test results on the PIH. Third, it is a direct contribution to the burgeoning literature on tax confusion and tax salience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing empirical evidence on PIH tests as well as tax confusion and tax salience. Section 3 presents a model that formalizes the intuition behind (incorrectly) interpreting after-tax income surprises. Section 4 describes our identification strategy. Section 5 describes the dataset that we use and the estimating equation.
Section 6 discusses our results as well as the robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Existing Empirical Evidence
In this section, we review the literature on testing the PIH and on taxpayer confusion, tax complexity, and tax salience.
Test of the PIH
The PIH is fundamental to many commonly used models of intertemporal behavior. As such, it has received a considerable attention in the literature. Due to similarity in research design, our study is most comparable to "natural experiment" papers that use cross-sectional and panel data on individual households. As we already mentioned in the introduction, the existing evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there are studies that do not find evidence in contrary to the PIH.
For example, Browning and Collado (2001) , using Spanish panel data, find that consumption does not respond to whether labor income is paid in equal instalments each month or with semiannual "bonuses". Coulibaly and Li (2006) , using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, examine the reaction of consumption to termination of mortgage payments and find no response either. On the other hand, there are studies that find that consumption increases with positive predictable income shocks, which is in contrary to the PIH. For example, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Parker (1999) analyzes the reaction of consumption to predictable after-payroll-tax income variation due to cross-sectional variation in social security withholding and due to within taxpayer variation in when the taxpayer hits the taxable income cap. He finds that consumption increases with after-payroll-tax income. Similar findings using various waves of the same survey are obtained by Souleles (1999) in reaction to the annual federal income tax refund, Souleles (2002) in reaction to pre-announced tax cuts in mid-1980s, Stephens (2003) in reaction to the timing of social security income, and Johnson et al. (2006) in reaction to the timing and amount of the 2001 tax rebate checks. The latter finding is also obtained by Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) using the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Using a different wave of the same survey, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) find that consumers report a consumption increase in response to a pure forward timing shift in the after-tax income originating from the 1991-92 change in federal income tax withholding. Stephens (2006) , using the UK Family Expenditure Survey, finds that consumption does respond to the timing of paycheck arrival. His is the only study of the ones cited here that can fully account for the findings by the presence of liquidity constraints proxied by age or the level of (liquid) assets.
Taxpayer Confusion, Tax Complexity, and Tax Salience
There is a stream of literature in public finance that analyzes how well-informed taxpayers are about the tax system that they face. One strand of this literature focuses on documenting taxpayer perceptions of the income tax schedule. Brown (1968) compares self-reported MTRs of a group of UK taxpayers to their actual MTRs computed out of employer pay records and concludes that taxpayers "think they pay higher rates of tax than is in fact the case." Fujii and Hawley (1988) , using the Survey of Consumer Finances, compare respondent self-reported MTRs to estimates of these MTRs based on the available survey demographic and income data. They find that individuals systematically underestimate their computed MTRs. 6 Romich and Weisner (2000) find that a high fraction of low-income households do not correctly perceive MTRs implied by the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for hypothetical levels of income. In particular, the respondents' knowledge appears to be based on experience within their current income range, which they incorrectly extrapolate to other income ranges. 7
One plausible reason why households may not have perfect information about their personal tax situation is due to complexity of the income tax. Indeed, the U.S. federal income tax code is filled with various deductions, credits, and exemptions, and knowing when one is or is not eligible for them requires a detailed knowledge of diverse and often arbitrary eligibility rules, phase-in and phase-out ranges, and possibly other details. Further research, reading, and computation may be needed to determine whether you can claim head of household filing status, an exemption for a dependent, the child and dependent care credit, the earned income tax credit, or tax credits related to your child's education, to name only some of the possibilities."
Experts are not the only ones who complain. According to a 2003 NPR/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Taxes Survey, 36 percent of respondents are more bothered by complexity of the federal income tax system than by the amount they pay in taxes or the feeling that rich people do not pay their "fair" share. 9 In addition, 90 percent of the respondents find the a certain income threshold, and after another threshold it decreases.tax system very or at least somewhat complicated. 10 When asked what factors contribute to this complexity, the respondents named factors such as "too much record-keeping" (62 percent), "too many different tax rates" (59 percent), or "forms being too hard to fill" (56 percent). However, all of these percentages are overwhelmed by 96 percent of the respondents thinking that complexity is partially due to "so many different kinds of deductions and tax credits, and so many rules about how to take them." Moreover, 64 percent consider the latter to be the most important source of complexity. In response to this complexity, taxpayers are increasingly looking to experts or computer software for help. 11 To the extent that a preparer or software is used only as a tax compliance tool or an ex post minimizer of tax liability, it is not clear that the use of these tools leads to better informed taxpayers. On the contrary, tax preparers and software allow taxpayers to escape the complexity of the tax code to a large degree, which is likely to further reduce taxpayer knowledge of the tax system. Put differently, by going through their tax forms and instructions the old-fashioned way, line by line, taxpayers who use the traditional method of tax filing may actually be better informed about details of the tax system.
Building on the idea of complexity, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) propose a simple hypothesis for how households interpret tax liability, or, equivalently, net income shocks. They suggest that households "schmedule", that is, approximate their true MTR by the average tax rate realized in the previous year, and provide some supportive evidence for this claim. They do not 10 This finding is based on the following question: "How complex do you think the current federal income tax system is? Do you think it is very complex, somewhat complex, not too complex or not complex at all?" conceptually distinguish between predictable and unpredictable income innovations, however. In fact, we will show in the next section that their hypothesis is a very special case of a more general updating model.
Rather than focusing on misperceptions and complexity, another strand of the literature focuses on the hypothesis that certain taxes or certain ways of framing them may be more visible, or salient, to the taxpayers in comparison with other taxes or other ways of framing them. For example, de Bartolome (1995) provides experimental evidence based on revealed choices that when the tax schedule is presented as a table mapping taxable income to the amount of tax entry by entry (as in the table accompanying the personal income tax form 1040), "there are at least as many individuals who use the average tax rate 'as if' it were the marginal tax rate, as individuals who use the true marginal tax rate." 12 Blumkin et al. (2007) provide experimental evidence that subject behavior is more sensitive to income as opposed to consumption taxes, despite the fact that the two are constructed to be theoretically equivalent. They attribute this finding in part to their experimental design where the income tax is designed to be more salient than the consumption tax. Chetty et al. (2007) find that consumer demand depends on whether the sales tax is included in the posted price despite the fact that the final after-tax price is the same in either case. Finkelstein (2007) goes a step further by arguing that if a particular tax or levy is less salient, then the tax base is less elastic to it, which in turn implies that the optimal tax or tax rate is higher. To support the claim, she documents that freeway toll charges are higher in places that use electronic toll debiting compared to places that collect tolls in cash.
Model
In this section, we formalize the intuitive hypothesis presented in Section 1 about how households interpret net income, or, equivalently, realized tax liability surprises. Formally, suppose that household i faces a linear tax schedule in every period t ∈ {0, ..., T } of its lifetime with the MTR given by τ it and the demogrant (a negative of the intercept) given by D it . That is, the tax liability T it (y) of this household in period t based on the taxable income y is determined by T it (y) = τ it y − D it for all y ≥ 0. This schedule varies from household to household because of different demographic characteristics such as the number of children and their age, taxpayers' age, disability status, type of income, etc. It also varies from year to year because of predictable and unpredictable changes in the tax schedule. The predictable changes are due to a variety of provisions related to the age of the taxpayers or their children, or due to tax consequences of planned actions such as mortgage interest payments. These changes are, under a stable tax system, predictable many years in advance. Unpredictable changes, on the other hand, are due to tax reforms as well as realization of states of the world that have tax consequences, such as medical expenditures, disability, number and timing of children, etc. In what follows, we will only focus on predictable changes. Unpredictable changes are obviously realistic, and they can easily be incorporated into the analysis without qualitatively affecting the results.
Formally, the parameters of the tax schedule affecting household i follow a process
where
) is a vector of predictable changes in the parameters of the tax schedule between years t and t + 1. However, the household may perceive these changes with error, resulting in its expectation of the change φ e it+1 diverging from the actual change φ it+1 . In particular, from the point of the view of the household, φ it+1 is a realization of N (φ e it+1 , S i ), with realizations in different time periods assumed to be independent. Although this simplifying assumption rules out the possibility that a tax liability surprise is perceived as a pure shift in the timing of taxes, it simplifies the exposition and allows us to focus on the confusion between changes in the intercept and the slope of the tax schedule. The matrix S i measures the household's ability to correctly perceive the predictable changes. For a perfectly informed household, S i = 0 2×2 , and hence the predictable changes are in fact predicted without error. For a less than perfectly informed household, S i is a non-zero positive semi-definite matrix, meaning that φ e it+1 is only a crude measure of the predictable change in the parameters of the tax schedule between periods t and t + 1. Although the normal distribution places a positive measure on the MTR exceeding unity or falling below any arbitrary negative threshold, the stochastic specification in (1) may be thought of as a tractable approximation of beliefs over a bounded interval and we therefore overlook the problem of unboundedness in what follows. 13 We also assume that the household does not necessarily have an exact knowledge of the tax schedule when it first enters the labor force. In particular, its prior beliefs about the MTR and 13 An alternative modeling strategy would be to assume mean reversion in the parameters of the tax schedule. This was done in a previous version of the paper and is available upon request. The exposition becomes more complicated with no effect on the qualitative results.
the demogrant of at the end of period 0 are given by
Again, the matrix Σ i0 determines the extent to which the household is aware of the details of the tax schedule when it first enters the labor force. For a fully informed household, Σ i0 = 0 2×2 , while for a less that fully informed household, Σ i0 is a nonzero positive semi-definite matrix.
A remark is necessary here. We treat Σ i0 and S i as exogenous, but in reality households have control over how detailed their knowledge of the tax schedule and its changes is. This would suggest introducing an explicit cost of information acquisition and modeling the two variance matrices as outcomes of comparing marginal costs and benefits of information (Feige and Pearce, 1976; Buiter, 1980; Reis, 2006; Demery and Duck, 2007) . However, since the purpose of the model presented in this subsection is to analytically illustrate simple mechanics of updating based on realized tax liability, we employ the simpler form with exogenous Σ i0 and S i . This form can be understood as a reduced-form version of a more complete optimal information acquisition model.
At the end of period t, the household files its tax return for that period. 14 Conditional on pre-tax income y it in period t, the household observes its tax liability given by
This tax liability serves as a signal for (τ it , D it ). The following proposition characterizes the evolution of beliefs about the parameters of future tax schedules based on past and current realizations of tax liability.
Proposition 1 Suppose that S i is positive definite, or that three of its elements are zero and the remaining diagonal element is positive. Then the beliefs about the parameters of the tax schedule
in period s ∈ {t + 1, .., T } at the end of period t are given by a normal distribution with mean
and variance
where Σ iu is defined recursively by
and
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, in each past and future period, the mean of beliefs over (τ iu , D iu ) T is adjusted by φ e iu relative to the previous period. In addition, the means of future beliefs are further adjusted by past realizations of tax liability surprises Signs of the effects of unpredicted tax liability realizations in period t on the expected value of the beliefs about the parameters of future tax schedules are given by the signs of the elements of Γ it . Given the assumptions on S i , (y it , −1) (Σ it−1 + S i ) (y it , −1) T is positive, and hence the signs of the elements Γ it depend on the signs of the elements of (Σ it−1 + S i ) (y it , −1) T . As we informally discussed before, one would expect that an unexpectedly high realization of tax liability would lead the household to revise upwards its belief about the MTR and to revise downwards its belief about the demogrant. However, this prediction hinges on the covariance between the prior beliefs about the two parameters from the previous period as well as on the covariance in the realization of their changes in the current period. The following proposition provides sufficient conditions for the intuitively appealing signs.
Proposition 2 Suppose that
15 If one assumes that the household is only confused about the MTR, but not about the demogrant, then all of the elements of S i and Σ i0 except for the element (1, 1) are equal to zero. In this case Proposition 1 implies that all of the elements of Σit−1 except for the element (1, 1) are equal to zero, and hence Γit = (1/yit, 0)
T . As a result, any unexpected hike in the tax liability is reflected in an increase in the expectation of future MTRs by the magnitude of the surprise in the realized average tax rate. If coupled with the assumption that there is no demogrant in any time period, this case corresponds to the "schmeduling" hypothesis considered by Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) . When schmeduling, a household predicts its MTR for the current period to coincide with the average tax rate realized in the previous period. not vary with income implies that the upward revaluation of the beliefs about the MTR and the resulting substitution effect are more common among low-income households relative to highincome households. Intuitively, the loss of a $600 tax credit, for example, is more profound for a low-income household than for a high-income household, both as a fraction of pre-tax income and as a fraction of the previous year's tax liability. We test this prediction in Section 6.
Then there exists an
ε it > 0 such that if |y it − y it−1 | < ε it , then [Γ it ] 11 > 0 > [Γ it ] 21 . That
Identification Strategy
We are interested in examining how the growth rate of parental labor income reacts to predictable lump-sum variation in after-tax income. Our identification strategy is based on variation generated by the eligibility rules for the Child Tax Credit (CTC). Beginning in 1998, taxpayers with a dependent below 17 years of age on December 31 of the tax year in question could claim a credit of $400 per eligible child. This credit was generally non-refundable and only households with sufficiently high tax liability were able to take full advantage of the credit. 16 At the same 16 There are several provisions in the tax code that make the tax schedule a function of whether a dependent child did or did not reach a certain age in a given tax year. One such provision is the loss in the eligibility for the personal exemption and the Earned Income Tax Credit for a dependent child who turns 19 (or 24, if a full time student). This provision has been exploited by Looney and Singhal (2004) and Dokko (2005) in order to estimate the effect of marginal tax rates on labor supply. Three features of the CTC make it a good natural experiment for testing our hypothesis of interest. First, to be eligible, the dependent child must not have reached 17 years of age by December 31 of the tax year in question. Because the timing of a child's 17th birthday is perfectly predictable, so is the implied timing of the net income loss. Second, before applying the CTC, virtually any household with up to two dependents above the income level of $30,000 had a tax liability in excess of the CTC within the time period we consider. As a result, the loss of the CTC constitutes a pure lump-sum change in tax liability, and hence after-tax income. In addition, the ACTC extends the same argument to many households with more dependents or smaller income.
On the other end of the income spectrum, the argument extends all the way to the adjusted gross income of $110,000, after which the phase-out range begins. The loss of the CTC therefore constitutes lump-sum variation in tax liability and net income for many households. In fact, we select the sample in such way that losing the CTC has no mechanical impact on the effective MTR for any of the households in the sample. Third, it can be difficult to plan the timing of birth for a particular quarter, month, or day. As a result, among families whose children turn 17 before the end of year t or at the beginning of year t + 1, eligibility for the CTC is virtually exogenous. 22 As a result, losing the CTC generates a predictable lump-sum variation in net income. In addition, the incidence if this variation is random across otherwise similar households. In particular, we 17 These families could claim the non-refundable part of the CTC up to the amount of employee contributed social security and medicare taxes less any earned income tax credit they received.
18 The $10,000 threshold has been indexed for inflation over time. In addition, starting in 2004, the ACTC limit was increased to 15 percent of earned income in excess of the threshold. Families with three or more eligible children could still claim the non-refundable part of the CTC up to the amount of employee contributed social security and medicare taxes less any earned income tax credit they received if this limit turned out to be higher.
19 The thresholds are $75,000 and $55,000 for single/head of household taxpayers and married taxpayers filing separately, respectively. None of these thresholds are indexed for inflation.
20 That is, a household loses $0.05 of the credit for every extra dollar of adjusted gross income above the threshold. 21 In general, based on IRS statistics, over 95% of married households file jointly. 22 In the next section, we discuss evidence why this may not be the case and test the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity in the timing of birth.
can identify the effect of this variation on the growth rate of parental labor income by a regression discontinuity design based on comparing the growth rate of parental labor income between years t and t + 1 for households whose child turned 17 in a fixed time window at the end year t (the treatment group) to households whose child turned 17 in the time window of the same length at the beginning year t + 1 (the control group).
Before continuing to the next section, it is necessary to review what different test results imply for how households perceive the loss of the CTC. Note that if the loss comes as a surprise, it decreases the expected lifetime resources of the household. Therefore, based on the discussion in Section 1, a finding of zero effect is consistent with the PIH, but it is also consistent with ex ante and ex post misperception, as long as the resulting income and substitution effects cancel each other out. A finding of a positive effect is inconsistent with the PIH on its own, but is consistent with it under liquidity constraints. In addition, it is also consistent with ex ante misperception without any ex post misperception, in which case the change reflects a surprise income effect.
However, it is also consistent with both ex ante and ex post misperceptions, as long as the resulting substitution effect is small. A finding of a negative effect is inconsistent with the PIH with or without liquidity constraints, and it is also inconsistent with ex ante misperception without any ex post misperception. It can only be explained by both misperceptions, with the substitution effect dominating any income effect. In sum, only the finding of a negative effect provides conclusive evidence for the presence of the substitution effect and hence an ex post misperception.
Data and Estimating Equation
Our identification strategy requires a dataset that contains information on household labor and non-labor income, number of children and their dates of birth, as well as basic household demo- The SIPP data also contain very specific information on the year and month of birth of each child in the household that allows us to divide households into the treatment (child turning 17 near the end of a tax year) and control (child turning 17 early in the subsequent tax year) groups. We compute tax liabilities and tax rates using the NBER's TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) calculator. 23 To implement our identification strategy, we require at least two complete consecutive years results, we use the time window of k = 6 months, but we also repeat the same estimation with k = 1 and k = 12. In order to minimize any omitted variable bias, it is desirable to define the time window to be as narrow as possible. One could speculate that an ideal experiment would compare children who turn 17 on December 31 of year t to children who turn 17 on January 1 of year t + 1. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the day of birth, and even if we did, we would not have a sufficient number of observations to implement such a narrow time window.
The choice of the three time windows that we use is driven by a tradeoff between the sharpness of the regression discontinuity design and the identification power due to available number of observations. 26
The 2001-2003 panel originally contains data on 36,700 households. We apply five restrictions to this data. First, we use data only on married couples that have at least one child who turns 17 23 An alternative dataset with more precise information on income and tax variables and a larger sample size would be the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) Tax Return Microfiles. However, this dataset is unsuitable for our analysis for two reasons. First, it does not provide information on dependents' ages, and it provides only very coarse information on household demographics. Second, for the time period after the CTC was introduced in 1998, only annual cross-sectional datasets are publicly available. 24 The subsequent results are robust to excluding the 2003 data and using only data from 2001 and 2002, for which we have complete data for all 4 quarters. These results are available from the authors upon request. Note that the results are identical for any imputation procedure that assumes that the 2003 income is a multiple, fixed across all households, of the income earned in the first 9 months of 2003.
25 As a result, in what follows, we will refer to this panel as the 1997-1998 panel. 26 We also tried using a weighting procedure in which observations closer to the cutoff date receive more weight than more distant observations. Using weights either linearly or exponentially decreasing in time from the cutoff date resulted in the same qualitative findings. The results are available from the authors upon request. due to the phase-out. Fourth, we want to make sure that the CTC-induced net income variation is lump sum. For that, the household must be facing neither the non-refundability constraint nor the phase-out range, since in those cases the loss of the credit affects the effective MTR. To deal with this problem, we run the TAXSIM calculator and compute the change in the tax liability and the effective MTR of a household between years t and t + 1, using the adjusted gross income from year t in both cases. The only variable that differs between the two years is the number of dependents eligible for the CTC. The analysis uses only the households for which, using this computation, the effective MTR is the same in both years and the change in the tax liability is equal to the change in the number of eligible dependents times $600. In other words, we limit our sample to only those households for whom, holding income constant, the CTC loss is a lump-sum change in the tax liability of a predictable size. Fifth, we drop any households in which at least one of the parents is above 62 years of age since we do not want to confound our results by retirement decisions. These stringent data requirements significantly reduce the available sample size to 1,830 households with 4,833 household-year observations. We control for four demographic variables for each spouse in our analysis: age and three indicator variables for the highest achieved education level: high school diploma, associate degree, or college degree. In addition, we control for the number of dependents in the household, where a dependent is defined as a child under the age of 24 living at home with parents. Of the 1,830 households in the data, 1,456 belong to one cohort, 347 belong to two, and 27 to three, due to having more than one child turn 17 between 2000 and 2004. Also, 39 households have more than one dependent in the same cohort (as would be the case for twins, for example). In the empirical analysis that follows, we focus on the six-month window before and after the turn of the year as our baseline specification. Panel A of Table 1 presents the means of the demographic variables, the marginal tax rate and its change over time, and labor income for the treatment and the control groups for the baseline six-month subsample. Results of standard t-tests show that the equality of means between these two groups cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance for any of the variables. In particular, not only does, by construction, the MTR remain constant for a fixed level of income, but the change in the realized MTR (which reflects behavioral responses) is statistically indistinguishable between the treatment and control groups. As a result, if there is a difference in the growth rate of labor income between the two groups, it is not driven by the heterogeneity of the two groups in terms of observable demographic characteristics or changes in their effective MTRs.
Using analogous sample restrictions on the 1997-1998 panel, the sample is reduced to 250 unique households, three of which have more than one child in the same cohort (the complete 1996-1999 panel originally contained 40,188 households). Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for this dataset with the treatment and control group definition based on the six-month time window. Again, the equality of means between the two groups cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance for any of the variables. The next section presents estimates of β 1 based on (9), and discusses a series of robustness checks that evaluate to what extent these estimates may be affected by a potential correlation between T it and u it+1 originating from an omitted variable bias due to a direct effect of child aging on parental labor income and from a potential spurious correlation between timing of birth and income. Table 2 reports our baseline results for the time window of plus or minus six months in column
Our estimating equation is given by
∆ ln Y it+1 = β 0 + β 1 T it + γI 2002 + π X it+1 + u it+1 ,(9)
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(1), one month in column (2), and 12 months in column (3) . The estimated coefficients are fairly robust over the three time windows. In column (1), the estimate of β 1 shows that households whose children turn 17 in the last six months of year t have (approximately) a 4.3 percentage point lower growth rate of labor income between years t and t + 1 compared to households whose child turns 17 in the first six months of year t + 1 (p-value equal to 0.079). Columns (2) and (3) show that the analogous estimates using the time window of one (twelve) months are given by 6.0(3.4) percentage points. The one-month estimate is not statistically significant at most conventional levels of significance, while the 12 month estimate has a p-value of 0.057.
The one-month specification most closely approaches our ideal regression discontinuity design, but it comes at the cost of few observations, and hence large standard errors. The results for the other two time windows suggest that the one-month window estimate is statistically rather than economically insignificant. As the size of the window is increased, we gain observations and therefore more precision in our estimates. However, the larger the window, the larger are the possible unobserved differences between our treatment and control groups. Because of this, we spend the next subsection testing our results for possible alternative explanations that may arise from the use of a larger time window.
Put together, Table 2 documents that the sign of the estimate of β 1 is robust to the choice of time window around the turn of the year, although statistical significance is not, with standard errors being smaller for a larger time window. Overall, the results contradict the null hypothesis of β 1 = 0 and support an alternative hypothesis of β 1 < 0. In light of the discussion in Section 4, this empirical result indicates the presence of a substitution effect, and, hence, imperfect ex post understanding of the surprise in net income. 27
Robustness Tests
Identification of the effect of losing the CTC on parental labor income by means of estimating β 1 in (9) by OLS rests on two basic assumptions: (1) eligibility for the credit is not correlated with any variables for which we do not control and that may have a systematic effect on the growth rate of parental labor income; and (2) there is no spurious correlation between the rate of labor income growth and the treatment variable. The purpose of this subsection is to examine potential violations of these assumptions and their impact on our interpretation of the results.
First, despite the regression discontinuity design, one may envision that the treatment variable T it may be correlated with unobserved changes in tastes for supplying labor. This is because, especially with larger time windows, households in the treatment group may have on average slightly older children than households in the control group. For example, in our baseline specification, children who are turning 17 in the treatment group are on average about 6 months older than children who are turning 17 in the control group. Combined with the possibility that the growth rate of parental labor income depends on the age of their children, the estimate of β 1 may confound the effect of losing the CTC with a direct effect of the child's age.
Second, Bound et al. (1995) cite a number of references documenting, among other things, that the season of birth may be directly correlated with income due to children from high income families being less likely to be born in the winter months. This argument would suggest a spurious correlation between the timing of birth and the household's income class. Given that we analyze the growth rate rather than the level of labor income, this criticism is not directly applicable to our identification strategy. However, as documented by Autor et al. (2005) , wage inequality among the U.S. households has been increasing over the period 1990-2005, albeit at a slower pace than in the preceding decades. As a result, the argument of Bound et al. (1995) may extend to the growth rate of labor income as well, raising a potential spurious correlation problem between the income growth rate and the treatment variable T it .
Third, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) argue that if a child is to be born around the turn of the year, parents may have a preference to speed up the birth on the margin so that they can claim tax benefits for the ending calendar year. The authors also find that such behavior is more prevalent among higher income households. Combined with the increasing wage inequality finding, this raises another potential spurious correlation problem.
All of these criticisms suggest that the baseline estimate of β 1 may be driven by factors that have nothing to do with the causal effect of the loss in the CTC on parental labor income.
However, all of these criticisms are equally applicable to ages other than 17, and the first two are also applicable to time cutoffs other than the end of a calendar year. As a result, if our estimated result is mostly driven by these correlations, we should obtain similar estimates of β 1 at other ages, such as 16 or 18, or at other time thresholds, such as a middle of a calendar year.
Panel A of Table 3 presents three placebo tests of this kind. In particular, it investigates, based on a six-month window, the impact on the growth rate of parental labor income between years t and t + 1 of a child: (1) turning 16 in the last six months of year t versus the first six months of year t + 1; (2) turning 17 in the first half of year t versus the second half of the same year t; and (3) turning 18 in the last six months of year t versus the first six months of year t + 1.
That is, we examine the impact of the child's timing of birth on parental labor income at times when the "treatment" has no CTC consequences (more precisely for (2), the CTC consequence is identical for treatment and control).
The estimate of β 1 in specification (1) is equal to −0.009. Although this estimate goes in the same direction as our baseline estimate, it is much smaller in magnitude and far away from statistical significance (p-value of 0.719). The estimates of β 1 in specifications (2) and (3) are positive and statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
This set of robustness tests shows that our estimates do not appear to be driven by a direct effect of child age or spurious correlation between income growth and the timing of birth as long as such correlations apply equally to ages other than 17 and are not dependent upon the end of the year cutoff date. These results also show that our baseline finding is not driven by a strategic intertemporal shifts in income realization between years t and t + 1. 28 However, one may still argue that there may be a direct timing of birth effect that is particular to the 17th birthday and to the end of the year cutoff. For example, if a local school district uses the December 31 or a nearby cutoff for the 6th birthday of a child in order to let the child enroll in the first grade in the preceding fall, children in the treatment group are much more likely to be in the senior rather than the junior year of their high school compared to children in the control group. As a result, the former are more likely to start college or work in the subsequent fall. This may have a direct impact on the growth rate of parental labor income, although we are not aware of any systematic evidence on the direction or size of this effect. 29, 30 The robustness tests presented above cannot, by construction, rule out that our baseline estimate is driven by such effect.
Presumably, though, such direct timing of birth effect that is particular to the 17th birthday 28 This could be the case, for example, if, in year t, the household is aware or "the tax increase", but perceives it as an MTR increase, giving it incentives to shift income realization from t + 1 to t. If such retiming were present, we should observe that the growth rate of labor income between years t + 1 and t + 2 or between years t − 1 and t is higher in the treatment group relative to the control group. But note that columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, by focusing on the time when the child is turning 16 or 18, respectively, investigate exactly such hypotheses, and cannot reject that there is no effect.
29 Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficiently comprehensive data on the school grade of the children to address this problem directly.
30 There is some evidence, though, on the effect of a child going to college on household consumption. In particular, Souleles (2000) finds that the effect is negligible.
should be present regardless of the presence of the CTC. As a result, this identification problem can be addressed by estimating a placebo effect of a child turning 17 before or after the end of a year in the absence of the CTC and compare it with an analogous effect in the presence of the CTC. We can implement this idea by applying our estimation strategy to the time period before 1998 (when the CTC was introduced), and comparing the estimate with the 2001-2003 estimate.
To do this, we apply the same estimating procedure to the 1997-1998 panel and compare the growth rate of labor income between 1997 and 1998 for households whose child turns 17 at the end of 1997 versus at the beginning of 1998. 31 Panel B of Table 3 CTC period (t ∈ {2001, 2002}). As a result, the effect measured by β 2 can be attributed to the introduction of the CTC, assuming that all other omitted factors that affected the growth rate of labor income between these two periods affected both types of households similarly. We estimate this equation by OLS and adjust the standard errors for clustering at the household level.
Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of this estimation. The estimate of β 2 is −0.067 using the six-month window and −0.038 using the 12-month window, with the p-values equal to 0.038 and 0.087, respectively. In other words, the loss on the CTC is estimated to reduce the growth rate of parental labor income by 3.8 to 6.7 percentage points. These estimates are similar in sign and significance to the baseline estimates, and, if anything, slightly larger in magnitude. The estimates of the direct effect β 1 of a child turning 17 before the turn of the year are positive and statistically highly insignificant, suggesting in yet another way that a direct effect of the child's date of birth does not appear to drive the baseline results.
Put together, these robustness checks document that a direct effect of child age or timing of birth on the growth rate of parental labor income or a spurious correlation between the latter and the timing (or season) of birth cannot account for the baseline estimates. We therefore conclude that our baseline estimates from Table 2 are robust to multiple plausible critiques of the identification strategy.
Finally, the discussion at the end of Section 3 concluded that that the shift in MTR beliefs should be more profound for lower-income households. This hypothesis suggests an additional robustness test based on the model's predictions. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate
using the six-month window, where t ∈ {2001, 2002} and Y AGI i2001 is 2001 adjusted gross income. This estimation allows to evaluate the hypothesis that the loss of the CTC is more salient for relatively lower income households and therefore would be more likely to affect behavior for that group of households. That is, the hypothesis predicts that β 4 > 0. 32 The estimate of β 4 is 0.001 with a p-value of 0.297. Table 4 lists estimates of the treatment effect for seven different levels of income together with their standard errors and p-values. 33 The estimates show that the treatment effect is negative and statistically (marginally) significant up until the income level of $60,000, and becomes insignificant at conventional levels afterwards. While we can't reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects evaluated at each income level are statistically different from one another, results from a Chow test (F(14, 708) = 3.95) confirm that we can reject equality between low and high income groups where low and high income are defined based on the bottom ($5,000-$60,000) 32 We would ideally like to divide our sample by some measure of permanent income though this is not possible in the current setting.
33 For an income level y, the treatment effect and the standard error are computed asβ 1 +β 4 y and
, respectively. 
Conclusion
Whether and how economic agents perceive predictable innovations in their income streams is an open question. The usual rationale underlying the permanent income hypothesis is that such innovations are predicted and hence, with a possible exception of liquidity constraints, have no impact on the intertemporal allocation of consumption and labor supply at the time when they are realized. The empirical tests paint a more mixed picture, though. They document that for certain types of innovations, households do a good job of predicting them and smooth their consumption, whereas for others they seem to be caught by surprise. Hsieh (2003) suggests that the former types of innovations are perhaps larger and more regular than the latter ones. However, if such misperceptions are driven by costly information gathering and processing or by bounded rationality, there is no reason to expect that households will misperceive these innovations ex ante, but perfectly understand their nature ex post. We therefore go a step further and investigate to what extent households understand the innovations ex post.
We argue that a majority of the existing empirical studies that focus on consumption as the outcome variable can speak to the question of ex ante understanding, but not to the question of ex post understanding. We propose that the latter can be analyzed by trying to infer, from household labor supply behavior, whether the nature of the innovations is misperceived ex post or not. We develop a formal model that shows that even though a predictable increase in the tax liability and hence a decrease in net income is lump-sum, households may partially perceive it as an increase in the marginal tax rate, which triggers the conventional substitution effect.
More precisely, the realization of the tax liability serves as a signal based on which households update their beliefs about both the level and the slope of the tax schedule. An unexpectedly high realization of the tax liability results in households increasing their belief about the level of the tax schedule and increasing their belief about the marginal tax rate as well. The model also predicts that the resulting shift in the beliefs and hence the resulting substitution effect is stronger for lower income households. Importantly, this model is consistent with full rationality but costly information gathering and processing. Alternatively, it is also consistent with bounded rationality.
To test this hypothesis, we use a regression discontinuity design based on the child age-cutoff rule for eligibility for the Child Tax Credit. We find that households who lose the credit due to having their child turn 17 slightly earlier than other households have a lower growth rate of parental labor income in the subsequent year. This finding is robust to a variety of tests that include placebo effects at various other age and calendar cutoffs, a placebo effect based on pre-CTC data, and a triple-difference estimator that compares the effect of a child turning 17 around the end of the year before and after the CTC was introduced. These placebo effect tests also imply that the two groups do not differ in the growth rate of parental labor income the year before or the year after the one in which we focus on in our baseline specification. As a result, the finding does not appear to be driven by strategic timing of income realization. In addition, we find that the effect diminished the higher the income class, which is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
We interpret the finding as evidence for the presence of the substitution effect on labor supply and evidence for imperfect ex post understanding of the credit loss. Taken at face value, this result suggests that policy changes that are not well-understood or predicted by the affected population, despite being predictable, may have unintended behavioral and welfare consequences. This may be the case especially for tax changes. In particular, changes that affect the level but not the slope of the tax schedule may result in a substitution effect that is not intended, hence increasing or reducing the deadweight loss relative to the full information case. On the other hand, changes that mostly affect the marginal tax rate may be partly interpreted as changes in the level of the tax schedule, with analogous implications for the deadweight loss. Complexity of the tax system may therefore interact with tax changes to create departures from conventionally understood welfare effects. This reasoning suggests that whenever households are likely to overshoot, relative to reality, their beliefs about the marginal tax rate, providing more and better information may be beneficial. On the other hand, just the opposite is the case when households are likely to undershoot. Similar reasoning applies to the design of pricing schemes as well. Whenever buyers overestimate the marginal price, providing more information benefits the seller, while just the opposite is the case if buyers underestimate it. At the policy level, this finding has implications for designing regulations on information disclosure, for example.
The simple model presented in this paper leaves several open areas for future research. First, in principle, if households face a price schedule about which they have imperfect knowledge, they may experiment in order to obtain more information. That is, there may be a feedback effect from the choice of labor supply to the process of belief evolution over time. Second, as mentioned before, it is likely that the degree of noise in predicting changes in the price schedule is determined endogenously by conscious information-gathering actions. For example, in case of taxes, this could be done by investing time to learn about the tax code or hiring a tax advisor. We believe that the second consideration is empirically relevant and deserves further inquiry. We also hope to stimulate more theoretical and empirical research on the issue of pricing scheme misperceptions and design. Based on observing the realization of T iu , the posterior belief about (τ iu , D iu ) is then given by (DeGroot,
where Σ iu and Γ iu are given by (6) and (7). Recursive application of this formula then gives (4) for any u ≤ t. For u > t, the mean and the variance of the beliefs are only affected by addition of independent increments of tax parameter changes.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that (7) implies (y iu , −1)Γ iu = 1, and hence, using (6), Given (8), the first element of S i (y it , −1) T is strictly positive, while the second element is strictly negative. As a result, if |y it − y it−1 | is small enough, the same sign pattern applies to the elements of (Σ it−1 + S i ) (y it , −1) T , and hence, by (7), also the elements of Γ it . represents the interaction term. Demographic controls include (for both husband and wife): age and age squared, education level indicators, and the total number of dependents.
3.
In specifications (1)- (3), t ∈ {2001, 2002}. In specifications (4)-(5), t = 1997. In specifications (6)- (7), t ∈ {1997, 2001, 2002}. The triple difference estimator estimator is based on equation (9).
4. P-values based on standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. 5. Source: SIPP 2001 and SIPP 1997 -1998 Notes:
1. The plots are based on the assumption that a household earns only labor income, does not itemize its deductions, and that all household members, including dependents, are eligible for a personal exemption.
2. Source: TAXSIM and Urban/Brookings Tax Policy Center.
